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Government Procurement with Strings Attached: The Uneven Control of Offsets 
by the World Trade Organization and Regional Trade Agreements 
 
David Collins 
 
 
This article explores the practice of governments imposing domestic content based 
requirements known as “offsets” on suppliers in order to secure public procurement contracts. 
Known to cause distortions in international trade, offsets are forbidden under the WTO’s GPA 
and in the procurement chapters of several RTAs, although these restrictions have severe 
limitations with full offset prohibitions only accepted by a handful of developed countries. 
Given the sensitivity of procurement policy and the need to stimulate local economies, Asian 
countries in particular show an unwillingness to address offsets in their international 
agreements. While other WTO agreements restrain the use of local content rules, these regimes 
are ill-suited to control the harmful effects of offsets in a procurement context because of their 
focus on traditional commercial markets. The article suggests that an enlargement of offset 
prohibitions would be advisable given the expected expansion of global procurement markets 
commensurate with economic development. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND OFFSETS 
Government procurement, meaning the purchasing of goods and services directly by public 
bodies, is a significant component of the global economy, accounting for between 10 and 15 
percent of national GDP on average and markedly higher for developed countries.  Rising 
infrastructure spending in many emerging markets bolstered by new development finance 
initiatives such as the BRICS Bank suggests that procurement will play an increasingly 
important role in the coming decades.1 Given its size and the global nature of many firms 
capable of supplying government needs, government procurement also represents an economic 
activity that is highly susceptible to harmful distortions through discriminatory policies.  
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Specifically, governments which choose to impose domestic content requirements on suppliers 
without regard to quality or price can drain public resources just as firms can end up spending 
more than needed to satisfy tender preferences. The rectification of these inefficient 
procurement practices, known as “offsets”, is one of the most important but often over-looked 
aims of the World Trade Organizations (WTO)’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) 
as well as procurement chapters of some Regional Trade Agreements.  
Following a brief illustration of the phenomenon of offsets in this introductory section, 
section two of this article will consider the extent to which procurement offsets are regulated 
under the WTO’s GPA, including available exceptions for developing countries, national 
security and general public interest matters. Section three will consider the possibility of 
controlling offset usage through two other WTO agreements, the Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMs) agreement and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(SCM), noting the inapplicability of these agreements to the non-commercial environment of 
public contracting. Section four will turn to offset controls in the procurement chapters of some 
RTAs, observing the unfortunately incomplete response of many of these agreements, 
particularly in the developing world. The article will conclude by recommending a more 
expansive control of offsets under international law. 
Before embarking on the analysis of offset controls in international trade law, it is 
apposite to explain precisely what is meant by an offset.  Offsets are conditions imposed by 
governments on supplying firms essentially as means to ensure a degree of local content or 
local participation. They are therefore tools for stimulating national economies, often in 
conjunction with a development strategy.  For supplying firms, offsets constitute additional 
conditions set out in tender documentation that are not directly related to the relevant 
procurement.  In one sense offsets may be viewed as discriminatory as they elevate domestic 
goods and services above those which are produced internationally.  However, offsets do not 
necessarily aim to exclude foreign bidders – all bidders in the procurement process are made 
subject to the same offset conditions regardless of their national origin. In this sense they are 
not inherently discriminatory.2  
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Specific definitions for offsets in the context of public procurement can be found in 
international instruments regulating this sphere of economic activity. These definitions 
commonly refer to offsets as conditions placed on a wide variety of commercial as well as 
procurement contracts.  Using the equivalent language of “countertrade” measures, the United 
Nations Conference on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has defined offsets as: “those 
transactions in which one party supplies goods, services, technology or other economic value 
to the second party, and in return, the first party purchases from the second party an agreed 
amount of goods, services, technology or other economic value.”3  In the government 
procurement context, which is the focus of this article, the purchasing party is always a 
government or other public authority.  
Originally associated with the defence sector of NATO countries, offsets became a 
fixture of international trade by the mid-1980s, with a number of countries applying them as a 
matter of course in procurement activities. This practice has now become widespread with 
more than 130 national governments engaging in offsets in one form or another.4 Korea in 
particular is known to impose high offset demands, with these requirements increasing from 
30 to 60 per cent of a contract’s full value.5  In most circumstances a firm’s offset obligation is 
worth between 50 and 100 per cent of the total value of the contract. This value is allegedly 
passed on to the procuring country in the form of economic benefits. The fulfilling of offset 
obligations is a key aspect of many firm’s strategy in securing international contracts, 
particularly in lucrative infrastructure and defence projects.  The size of the global offset market 
is thought to be more than US $75 billion per year with expectations that it will balloon to as 
much as US $500 billion within the next decade.6 
 Procurement offsets are generally viewed as inefficient and counterproductive, 
diverting trade away from highest value uses.  Rather than compete on the basis of the price 
and quality of their goods and services, suppliers win procurement contracts because of their 
degree of local content, even where this involves governments purchasing equipment of 
services it does not need or more likely, pays more than is necessary to obtain the goods and 
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services because of the offset terms, a clear welfare loss. At the same time, benefits which may 
be incurred by the domestic economy are difficult to quantify, in part because offset agreements 
are often spread over many years, and may be characterized as more political (satisfying 
particular constituents) than economic (benefiting the general public).  The actual impact of 
offsets in terms of job creation or diversion, technology transfer, and increased international 
competitiveness of the domestic industry tends to be much smaller than expected.7 In addition 
to their dubious economic benefits and their distortive effects on international trade, offset 
arrangements are viewed as a form of bribery and are associated with corruption, particularly 
when negotiations are initiated by suppliers rather than governments.8  Data on offsets, 
especially in relation to defence contracts, is troublingly scarce. Few firms report these 
expenses to their shareholders and countries are reluctant to publicize such arrangements.  
Accordingly the magnitude of offsets may be considerably more than is realized.9 It is 
important to recognize that some studies have shown that certain types of offsets can be 
economically advantageous for less advanced countries, in some cases contributing to 
knowledge transfer and other efficiency gains.10 Their potential for welfare-enhancement is 
undoubtedly one of the reasons that offsets have persisted as a policy tool in many countries. 
Despite the acknowledged harm of domestic content rules in procurement policies, 
there has been limited academic legal commentary on the use of offsets. Much of the existing 
discussion of procurement offsets relates to the exceptions found in many national and 
international legal systems in favour of defence procurement, the sector in which offsets remain 
the most popular and where prohibitions in international and national laws do not apply.11  This 
article fills a critical gap in the academic legal literature by examining the mechanisms 
available in international law for controlling this serious impediment to international trade. 
 
II. OFFSETS AND THE WTO GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT AGREEMENT 
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A. The Government Procurement Agreement (“GPA”) 
The GPA is a plurilateral agreement, meaning that it is optional to the WTO’s 162 Members. 
Currently there are 17 parties to the GPA comprising 45 WTO members, 28 of which are the 
Member states of the EU. A further 29 WTO members participate in the GPA Committee as 
observers, ten of which are in the process of acceding to the Agreement.  The steady but 
growing membership of the GPA reflects the potential for plurilateralism as a workable method 
of drawing more fields of economic governance into the international regulatory sphere of the 
WTO. However, its limited membership equally demonstrates the difficulty in achieving 
multilateral consensus over such a sensitive field of economic policy. Given the large role that 
governments play in many economies, the regulation of public procurement under international 
law remains highly contentious throughout the world. 
The objective of the GPA is to liberalize government procurement markets among its 
signatory parties by eliminating discrimination against suppliers based on their nationality and 
by ensuring transparency in tendering procedures. This should facilitate competition for public 
contracts in goods and services on the basis of quality and price. The 1994 GPA (which itself 
was a revision of the 1979 GPA from the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations) was finalized in 
1994 but a revised version of the agreement went into force in 2014.  Under the Revised GPA, 
parties undertake to engage in further negotiations in order to progressively reduce and 
eliminate additional discriminatory measures in order to expand the agreement’s coverage.  
According to the WTO itself, the WTO government procurement agreements are believed to 
facilitate procurement activities worth US $1.7 trillion per year.12 
 The greatest weakness with the GPA as an instrument of regulating offsets, or indeed 
imposing rules on government procurement regulations of any kind, is its optional nature, 
covering less than one fifth of the WTO’s total membership. Moreover, even among the 
countries which have signed it, the GPA imposes incomplete coverage over public procurement 
activities because of the selective nature of its obligations. The GPA resembles the WTO’s 
General Agreement on Trade in Services in that signatory parties only have to make the 
commitments they wish to, on a positive list basis.  Covered procurement is listed for each 
signatory in a separate set of schedules and non-listed sectors do not engage the agreement’s 
obligations. Parties need only commit the particular governmental agencies and types of 
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procurement contracts that are suited to their policy needs.  Parties also set minimum monetary 
thresholds below which their procurement obligations will not apply based on the International 
Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Right, a method intended to exclude procurement activities 
of small and medium sized enterprises. Unfortunately many GPA signatories omitted broad 
swathes of their procurement activities from the scope of their GPA commitments. 
 The GPA is subject to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement System and to date there has been 
one dispute brought through this system which resulted in a panel report on the basis of the 
GPA.  This dispute, Korea-Government Procurement13 did not consider offsets but rather 
concerned a US complaint regarding the Korean government’s procurement practices in 
relation to airport construction. The panel sided with Korea, ruling that its government had not 
made commitments under the GPA for the relevant procuring entities and consequently the 
GPA’s rules were not engaged.   
 
B. Offset Prohibitions 
Although the Revised GPA has come into effect for most parties, the GPA 1994 remains in 
force for those parties who are still in the process of ratifying the revised Agreement. The two 
versions of the GPA co-exist until all parties to the Agreement are bound by the revised 
Agreement. With respect to the obligations between a party to the GPA 1994 and a party to the 
Revised GPA, the GPA 1994 will govern.  Accordingly, the GPA 1994’s treatment of offsets 
remain relevant. 
To begin with, the GPA 1994 contains an interpretive note which provides a definition 
of offsets: 
Offsets in government procurement are measures used to encourage local development or 
improve the balance-of-payments accounts by means of domestic content, licensing of 
technology, investment requirements, counter-trade or similar requirements.14 
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This section offers an indication of the types of measures which will be encompassed by the 
provision and does so in a manner that focus on the aims of the measure – local development 
and balance of payments equilibrium respectively. 
Most crucially, the GPA 1994 contains the following key provision which prohibits 
government entities from imposing offsets as a condition for the award of contracts: 
Entities shall not, in the qualification and selection of suppliers, products or services, or in the 
evaluation of tenders and award of contracts, impose, seek or consider offsets.15 
 
This straightforward injunction, capturing both the imposition of traditional offsets by 
governments as well as the less common proactive offering of offsets by firms in order to secure 
winning tenders is tempered by the next section exempting developing countries: 
 
Nevertheless … a developing country may at the time of accession negotiate conditions for the 
use of offsets, such as requirements for the incorporation of domestic content. Such 
requirements shall be used only for qualification to participate in the procurement process and 
not as criteria for awarding contracts. Conditions shall be objective, clearly defined and non-
discriminatory … and may include precise limitations on the imposition of offsets in any 
[procurement] contract ... The existence of such conditions shall be notified to the Committee 
and included in the notice of intended procurement and other documentation.16 
 
Accordingly, under the 1994 GPA, there is broad scope for developing states to impose offsets 
subject to notification requirements. This exception to the offset prohibition is based on the 
“infant industry” rationale. Firms from developing countries cannot always compete 
effectively with those from the developed world and the assistance of such preferences allows 
them to develop into mature market participants.17 So far this exception is of limited 
importance, however, given that there are currently no GPA signatories that classify as 
developing (with the arguable exceptions of Israel and Armenia). 
The Revised GPA repeats the definition of offset found in the earlier agreement (almost 
verbatim), although places it in the formal definition section of the agreement.18  As in the GPA 
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1994, the revised agreement prohibits offsets outright with the following language: “With 
regard to covered procurement, a Party, including its procuring entities, shall not seek, take 
account of, impose or enforce any offset.”19 There is also an exception for developing countries, 
with a similar proviso that the developing country imposing an offset must clearly state that an 
offset will be applied in the notice of intended procurement and that it must be applied in a 
manner that does not discriminate among other signatories.20 In other words, should a 
developing country ever sign the GPA, it may impose offsets, so long as they do not favour 
goods or services from one signatory state over another one - effectively a most favoured nation 
limitation. Infant industry assistance should be used as a development tool, not as a means of 
according preferences based on political alliances between states, such as for example those 
based on former colonial ties. Given the scope of use of offsets permitted by developing 
countries, the Revised GPA’s treatment of offsets may actually amount to somewhat of a 
relaxation of the rules on offsets compared to the earlier agreement. The GPA 1994’s 
requirement that offsets should be used only for qualification to participate in the procurement 
process and not as criteria for awarding contracts has been dropped.  Put more simply, under 
the GPA 1994 a government body may not invite foreign suppliers to offer as high an offset 
obligation as they are able to and then award the tender to the supplier that offered the highest 
level of offset. Still, it is likely that even under the new GPA, conditions on how developing 
countries may use offsets will be negotiated along with its special treatment package with other 
GPA parties.21 
As noted above, the GPA only embraces the sectors and thresholds chosen by the 
individual party and if offsets are important to a particular purchasing entity they can remain, 
provided that this is stipulated in each party’s commitments.  With the offsets effectively 
removed from the policy toolkit of GPA signatories, party governments can instead choose to 
negotiate specific exceptions to this provision in the scope or coverage of their specific 
commitments as set out in the annexes of the agreement. Such exceptions tend not to be phrased 
using the word “offsets” but rather reference particular types of procurement for which local 
content preferences will be accorded.  For example Canada’s sub-central (provincial) 
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commitments under the GPA excludes procurement that is intended to contribute to economic 
development of the various listed provinces and territories.22 
Although the GPAs are subject to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement System, a key feature 
of the GPA regime is that it further enshrines private firms’ capacity to bring claims for breach 
of the agreement’s procurement rules by signatory parties directly against governments through 
mandatory domestic dispute settlement procedures. WTO procurement rules require signatory 
parties to maintain domestic judicial and administrative procedures through which the fairness 
of procurement bidding and tendering procedures, including offset prohibitions, may be 
challenged. In addition to the above mentioned exceptions for developing countries and the 
capacity for parties to exclude offsets from the coverage or scope of their procurement 
commitments, both GPA agreements contain exceptions for national security and general 
exceptions relating to public policy concerns. 
 As noted above, national defence is the chief economic sector in which procurement 
offsets have been traditionally used.  The Revised GPA contains the following national security 
exception which is broadly similar to that contained in the GPA 1994: 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any Party from taking any action or 
not disclosing any information that it considers necessary for the protection of its essential 
security interests relating to the procurement of arms, ammunition or war materials, or to 
procurement indispensable for national security or for national defence purposes.23 
 
There has been much academic debate on the use of national security based exemptions in 
international economic law. Much of this centres around the possibility of abuse of the so-
called self-judging nature of many of these provisions, such as the one found here.24  
Nevertheless, it is impossible to imagine a multilateral treaty, particularly one on procurement, 
which would not contain this type of carve-out. The vast majority of exemptions to offset rules 
have come from defence oriented procurement.25 
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The GPA also contains a General Exception clause which uses similar wording to that 
of GATT Article XX. Accordingly GPA parties could potentially justify their use of offsets 
where this is necessary to protect public morals, order or safety, human, animal or plant life or 
health and the protection of intellectual property. These interests are subject to the overall 
requirement, also taken from GATT XX, that the measures must not be applied in a manner 
that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.26 As there are no 
disputes in which these exceptions have been asserted by GPA parties it is not clear how WTO 
panels will interpret these provisions in the context of procurement offsets. It is most likely that 
they will use GATT Article XX jurisprudence for guidance.  
 
 
III. OFFSET CONTROLS UNDER OTHER WTO INSTRUMENTS 
No other WTO instruments deal directly with procurement offsets but the spirit of prevention 
of the distortive effects local content rules can be detected in other spheres of WTO law, none 
of which would likely operate as a genuine legal barrier to their use. A consideration of these 
rules sheds some light on the highly sensitive nature of procurement as a special kind of 
economic activity that has been cautiously carved out from WTO’s disciplines. 
 
 
A. Performance Requirement Prohibitions 
While offsets operate as an impediment to international trade in goods and services, they may 
also act as obstacles to foreign direct investment in the sense that goods or services-based 
restrictions placed on foreign investors could impair a foreign firm’s ability to enter or compete 
in the domestic market.  In this sense, offsets are a subset of what are known as “performance 
requirements” - conditions placed on foreign firms by host states which require foreign firms 
to engage in certain conduct, for example to use a certain amount of local content.  Performance 
requirements, although unrelated to public procurement, are a trade-distorting as well as FDI 
restrictive variety of offset.  The similarity has not gone unnoticed by investment arbitration 
tribunals which have even used the language of performance requirements when referring to 
government procurement offset provisions.27 
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The primary instrument under international law for controlling the use of performance 
requirements as imposed on foreign investors is the WTO’s Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMs) Agreement. This minimalistic agreement uses yet another term “trade-
related investment measures” to capture the types of conditions that can be associated with 
offsets, namely domestic content. Trade-related investment measures cover only goods-
oriented conditions on foreign firms, not services.  Although trade-related investment measures 
are not defined under the TRIMs, an illustrative list of types of these measures that are 
inconsistent with GATT’s national treatment provisions (and which therefore violate Article 
2.1 of the TRIMs) are contained in an Annex to the agreement. Generally speaking these reflect 
the use of local goods, essentially the same policy objective as many procurement offsets.  
 The illustrative list states that prohibited trade-related investment measures include 
those measures which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under 
administrative rulings, or which compliance with is “necessary to obtain an advantage.”28   
Although the term “advantage” is not defined in the TRIMs, the Appellate Body in the Canada-
Aircraft dispute noted that compliance with a trade-related investment measure in order to 
obtain an “advantage” under the TRIMs may contemplate forms other than a “financial 
contribution” or “benefit” (such as envisioned by the SCM, see further below.)  Moreover, no 
comparison with a market benchmark is required under TRIMs for the purpose of ascertaining 
whether an advantage has been conferred, as in benefits under the SCM.29 Rather, “advantage” 
is understood to encompass all types of advantages, not simply public financial contributions.30  
It is unclear whether the purchase of goods by a public authority would qualify as an advantage, 
but given that this constitutes a “benefit” under the SCM (see below) it is not difficult to 
imagine that a panel could reason so.  In that sense the TRIMs could be viewed as an indirect 
means of controlling goods-based offset requirements imposed in conjunction with 
procurement. One of the problems with this possibility, however, is that the GATT”s national 
treatment obligation (which is incorporated in the TRIMs through Article 2.1) expressly does 
not apply to procurement activities by governments or government agencies.31  
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The national treatment provision of GATT was examined in the Canada-Feed-In-Tariff 
dispute,32 one of the few WTO cases dealing with the TRIMs. This dispute concerned Canadian 
province of Ontario’s imposition of domestic content rules on solar and wind powered 
electricity providers in order for such providers to qualify for guaranteed prices under the Feed 
in Tariff programme.  In addition to assertions of illegal subsidization (see further below) Japan 
and the European Union contended that Canada’s Feed-in Tariff program containing local 
content rules violated the national treatment obligation of Article III of the GATT and Article 
2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement (as a trade-related investment measure inconsistent with GATT’s 
national treatment obligation). Canada claimed that the Feed-in-Tariff scheme entailed 
government procurement and therefore should be exempted under GATT Article III:(8)(a) 
which would in turn remove the measure from consideration under the TRIMs.  Finding against 
Canada that the measure was a trade-related investment measure and a GATT-inconsistent 
local content requirement, the panel ruled that the scheme was not excluded from the coverage 
under GATT III:8(a) because the government of Ontario’s procurement of electricity under the 
FIT Programme was undertaken with a view to commercial resale. In other words, it was 
outside the sphere of normal procurement activity where governments purchase goods and 
services for their own use. The Appellate Body confirmed this finding, also ruling that the 
relevant measure did not fit the GATT exception for public purchasing found in Article III:8 
(a) and as such led to violations of both GATT Article III and TRIMs Article 2.1 as prohibited 
local content rules. This decision appears to preclude the application of government 
procurement offsets to TRIMs discipline. Had the electricity been for government use rather 
than for resale, the Article III:8(a) procurement exception would have applied, thereby 
insulating the local content requirements from review under GATT Article III. 
 
B. Subsidies 
The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) controls the use of 
subsidies, effectively government assistance to private firms, because these are seen as market 
distortions which lead to inefficient allocation of resources and interfere with international 
trade in goods. While the SCM contains no express reference to either offsets or public 
procurement, it does establish that the purchasing of goods (but not services) by governments 
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may be considered a subsidy.33 While the definitions of “purchase” and “procurement” are 
arguably dissimilar34, there is no WTO jurisprudence establishing whether or not this provision 
could encompass public procurement transactions. At first blush it seems at least plausible that 
“subsidy” could contemplate public procurement – the firm which wins the bid gains an 
advantage in that it secures a contract that is directly the result of government action.  In an 
offset it is not the government’s act of choosing the specific (domestic) supplier which confers 
the advantage but rather the act of the supplying firm purchasing domestic inputs at the 
government’s behest. The offset, as the proximate cause of the purchase, may therefore be 
conceived as an indirect or derived subsidy. Furthermore, the SCM clearly prohibits domestic 
content-based subsidies which are analogous to offsets.35 Taken together, these two features of 
the SCM appear to forbid offset-type measures in relation to public procurement of goods. The 
difficulty with fitting public procurement and related offset obligations into the scope of SCM’s 
disciplines as illegal subsidies, however, lies in additional requirements of benefit and 
specificity.   
 First and most importantly, the SCM is unlikely to capture traditional government 
procurement transactions (and in that sense restrict offsets) because of the understanding of 
“conferral of benefit” articulated in Article 14 d).  This article states: 
 
the provision of goods or services or purchase of goods by a government shall not be considered 
as conferring a benefit unless the provision is made for less than adequate remuneration, or the 
purchase is made for more than adequate remuneration. The adequacy of remuneration shall 
be determined in relation to prevailing market conditions for the good or service in question)… 
 
 
Clearly, then, public procurement cannot be considered a subsidy unless the governmental 
authority pays more or less than normal market conditions would dictate, neither of which 
would normally apply to offset arrangements where the advantage is winning the contract, not 
being paid more to perform it. Putting aside for the moment that it is difficult to establish 
normal market conditions where there is traditionally one purchaser which is a government (for 
example infrastructure construction) recall that offset arrangements tend to add additional costs 
to the supply contract (in some cases more than 50 per cent). But this is not what is meant by 
the “less than adequate remuneration,” which contemplates that the firm receives goods or 
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services from the government and does not pay the full price for them.  Rather, an offset means 
that the supplying firm ends up being paid less than it should have been because of the burden 
of fulfilling the offset obligation.36  Therefore an offset would appear to preclude a finding that 
government procurement constituted an unlawful subsidy. In other words, offset-based 
procurements cannot be construed as subsidies precisely because they also impose costs on 
suppliers (the obligation to use local inputs or to engage in knowledge transfer) as well as the 
obvious benefit (that their goods are purchased by the government in the first place). Indeed 
offsets illustrate the “other side of the ledger” that characterizes various subsidy arrangements, 
i.e. the often unacknowledged reality that many subsidy programs also impose costs on private 
firms.37  
 Secondly, in order to qualify as a subsidy, measures must satisfy the requirement of 
specificity.38  It is unlikely that procurement subject to offsets would satisfy this criterion either.  
WTO jurisprudence has established that specificity will be found where the public body 
explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises.39 In the context of an offset this could 
mean that the purchase of goods (the subsidy) was available only to firms using local inputs.40  
But this is not what was meant by “certain enterprises” as illustrated in the next subsection; 
specificity will not exist where there are, as Art 2.1 b) of the SCM puts it: “objective criteria 
or conditions governing the eligibility” for the subsidy [for example the use of local inputs], 
the “eligibility is automatic” [if they abide by the offset requirement they will be entitled to the 
subsidy] and that the “conditions are strictly adhered to” [no favouritism or bribes etc.] which 
has been understood by the Appellate Body to indicate openness of access to the subsidy.41 
These cumulative criteria, characterizing traditional offset procurement arrangements which 
are imposed not only to domestic firms but to all firms, would almost certainly remove them 
from the scope of the purview of the SCM.   
The difficulty of bringing local content procurement rules into the scope of the SCM 
was also contemplated by the WTO panel and Appellate Body in the Canada – Feed in Tariff 
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dispute, noted above. In addition to allegations of TRIMs violations, the complainants argued 
that Ontario’s Feed-In-Tariff regime breached Article 3.1 b) of the SCM as a prohibited import 
substitution measure. While the panel concluded that the programme did amount to a financial 
contribution by the government as a purchase of goods, a majority of the panel dismissed the 
allegations that the challenged measures amounted to a subsidy under Article 1.1 b) of the SCM 
on the basis that there was no benefit conferred on given suppliers as required under Article 14 
d). This was because the relevant renewable energy market was not competitive, rather it was 
significantly controlled by government intervention and as such it was impossible to determine 
whether the remuneration was adequate or not, as required by that section. Put another way, 
traditional government procurement cannot be considered a subsidy as it is understood in the 
SCM because it is by definition outside normal market conditions.42 Such conditions occur, for 
example, where there is a significant degree of government purchasing in the relevant sector. 
The Appellate Body was unable to determine whether the challenged measures conferred a 
benefit on certain electricity suppliers and were therefore inconsistent with the SCM’s 
disallowance of domestic content obligations. This was because there was no clear market 
benchmark with which to gage adequate remuneration under Article 14 d).  
The Canada – Feed in Tariff case demonstrates the unlikelihood that local content 
procurement rules could qualify as prohibited measures under the SCM, despite the fact that 
they afford an advantage to local industries.  Although the SCM prohibits subsidies that are 
contingent on the use of domestic goods, a contested local content requirement must first be 
proven to confer a benefit within the meaning of the agreement and it could not be established 
that Ontario’s Feed-in Tariff program did confer a benefit on domestic wind and solar power 
manufacturers.  This does not so much demonstrate a failing of the WTO panels and Appellate 
Body to rigorously apply SCM rules where government assistance has been provided as some 
commentators have noted,43 but is better seen as a reflection of the fact that a meaningful 
market benchmark is difficult to establish for renewable energy given the historic dominance 
governments have in this sector.44  More fundamentally, many industries in which there is a 
significant degree of government purchasing may be similarly affected, even where there is 
competitive transparent tendering.  Identifying the illegitimacy of domestic content 
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requirements in markets with heavy government participation, such as large scale 
infrastructure, may illustrate precisely why the SCM agreement is ill-suited as an instrument 
to regulate the use of offsets. 
 
 
IV. OFFSETS IN PROCUREMENT CHAPTERS OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
Government procurement is a highly sensitive issue and remains poorly covered under RTAs 
relative to other spheres such as goods and services.  The countries which have made the 
deepest procurement commitments in RTAs tend to be developed countries, notably the US, 
which has included a procurement chapter forbidding offsets in all of its RTAs. Canada and 
the EU have also demonstrated a willingness to embrace procurement including offset 
prohibitions in their trade agreements. As of 2011, 44 per cent of RTAs including government 
procurement chapters contained a prohibition on offsets as a basic rule. There is a clear 
correlation between comprehensive procurement rules and the prohibition of offsets – those 
agreements which have detailed rules tend to also forbid offsets.45 It is somewhat surprising 
that the UNCITRAL Model Law on public procurement makes no reference to offsets 
whatsoever46, effectively encouraging countries to retain their capacity to make use of this 
policy tool. 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, the US and 
Mexico contains an offset prohibition in its government procurement chapter. It closely 
resembles that of the GPA and reads as follows: 
Each Party shall ensure that its entities do not, in the qualification and selection of suppliers, 
goods or services, in the evaluation of bids or the award of contracts, consider, seek or impose 
offsets. For purposes of this Article, offsets means conditions imposed or considered by an 
entity prior to or in the course of its procurement process that encourage local development or 
improve its Party’s balance of payments accounts, by means of requirements of local content, 
licensing of technology, investment, counter-trade or similar requirements.47  
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In addition to essential security and various public policy exceptions along the lines of GATT 
XX, NAFTA allows offset-type conditions to be imposed in procurement in conjunction with 
“Joint Programs for Small Business” in order to foster support for this critical category of 
supplier.48  NAFTA also initially allowed Mexico to set aside half of its procurement in oil and 
electricity companies per year for domestic suppliers on a temporary basis and also allowed 
mandatory local content in some construction projects, a recognition of the sensitivity of 
Mexico as the only developing country in the RTA.49 
 The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) recently concluded 
between Canada and Europe uses a definition of offset in its procurement chapter similar to 
that contained in the GPA, which is unsurprising given that both parties are GPA signatories.  
As with the GPA, CETA prohibits the use of offsets outright.50 Given the deep procurement 
commitments contained in the CETA51 this provision should be seen as a considerable achievement 
in eliminating the harmful effects of offsets.  CETA also contains national security exceptions 
which should facilitate defence-oriented procurement as well as general exceptions covering a 
range of serious public policy issues. 
The final text of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) still under 
negotiation between the US and Europe will likely include a procurement chapter. Given recent 
treaty practice of the US and the EU, the procurement rules will probably resemble those of 
the GPA, with specific government agencies and procurement activities outlined in separate 
schedules or appendices. The EU is not expected to accord its most comprehensive 
procurement coverage to the US under the TTIP because it is dissatisfied with the level of 
procurement that the US offered through its GPA commitments.  In contrast to the EU’s desire 
for greater access to US procurement, firms in the US are generally satisfied with their access 
to procurement in Europe.52 The TTIP will almost certainly contain exemptions in relation to 
defence procurement and national security, most likely using standard self-judging language. 
Public procurement tends to be entirely absent in African and Latin American RTAs, 
again likely reflecting the realities that preferential procurement remains an instrument of 
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domestic development.  Of significant concern is the unfortunate failure of many Asian RTAs 
to include comprehensive government procurement disciplines even among those nations 
which are accurately described as “emerging markets” with large public infrastructure budgets. 
Many Asian RTAs minimize or entirely omit government procurement provisions. The 
approach to procurement among Asia’s large economies in particular (China, India and Japan) 
has been accurately described as “cautious.”53 Given the growing strength of many Asian 
economies and the need for sustained global integration in order to achieve further growth as 
well as the obvious advantage of efficiency in public expenditure, commentators have urged 
that Asian states should include deeper government procurement commitments in their trade 
agreements.54  
The feasibility of using offsets going forward has been significantly undermined by the 
highly anticipated Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), an economic integration agreement 
covering trade and investment that was recently concluded among 12 Pacific Rim countries: 
the United States, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Viet Nam.  Under its current membership (even lacking China 
and Korea), the TPP is the largest agreement in Asia to include government procurement 
commitments.  Given that China, Korea and others may ultimately join the TPP, the economic 
size of this agreement means that it will play a crucial role in setting the procurement standards 
for trade agreements in Asia going forward.55 The TPP’s chapter on government procurement 
defines offsets using almost identical language to the Revised GPA.56 Most importantly, the 
TPP follows the GPA’s lead by prohibiting the imposition of offsets for covered procurement 
by any party57 also granting an exception for developing countries subject to a notice 
requirement.58 The TPP’s procurement chapter does contain its own WTO-style general 
exceptions, again identical to those of the Revised GPA59 along with a self-judging national 
security provision, both of which could operate to facilitate offsets in limited circumstances.60 
Interestingly, the TPP also allows Parties to adopt temporary measures for the purposes of 
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dealing with serious balance of payments or external financial difficulties,61 a provision which 
is lacking from the Revised GPA. Such circumstances could possibly justify procurement 
offsets provided that they are imposed on a most-favoured nation basis and are no more onerous 
than necessary. Since offsets are defined in the TPP (as elsewhere) in part as measures having 
the aim of “improving a Party’s balance of payments accounts” they appear to invite the use of 
this exception as a potential justification. The temporal limit on the balance of payments 
exception would be of little help in controlling offsets tied to a few lucrative tenders. Some 
further guidance on the type of offsets which would fit within the balance of payments 
exception may ultimately be disclosed through jurisprudence.   
Some Asian RTAs have excluded government procurement entirely or used so-called 
“procurement-lite” provisions which contain mostly vague statements regarding transparency 
and cooperation in procurement regulations without any discussion of offsets.  The value of 
these provisions should not be understated, but they do little to control public procurement-
based protectionism. India’s RTA with Korea contains such pronouncements62 and is the only 
Indian RTA that has any reference to procurement whatsoever. Despite the fact that China 
currently has observer status to the GPA as well as obviously being of immense importance to 
the global economy (not to mention its massive public infrastructure budget), no Chinese RTAs 
contain comprehensive procurement chapters with offset restrictions. In keeping with the 
procurement-lite format, the China-Korea Free Trade Agreement does attempt to promote 
cooperation in the field of government procurement with a view to establishing a full agreement 
on procurement upon China’s eventual accession to the GPA63 but goes no further. The 
Australia-Singapore RTA has one of the most curious procurement chapters of all, which 
despite being comprehensive in its detail (many of its provisions resemble those of the GPA) 
there is no mention of offsets whatsoever, suggesting that such arrangements remain vital 
economic instruments in these countries despite the fact that they are fully developed 
economies. Tellingly, this RTA expressly preserves the right of the Australian government to 
promote employment for significant indigenous communities as well as SMEs in its 
procurement contracts.64 
Japan’s practice with respect to offset prohibition is worthy of mention both because of 
its inconsistency and because Japan has significant influence in the region.  While Japan is a 
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signatory to the GPA, the Japan-ASEAN Economic Partnership agreement, to take one 
example, lacks a procurement chapter altogether.65 The Japan-Mongolia Economic Partnership 
Agreement66 is a good example of a procurement-lite approach that neglects offsets. The 
agreement simply requires parties to ensure that their procurement laws are transparent and 
fairly implemented, also requiring parties to share information about their respective 
procurement regulations.67 It goes on to promise that parties will enter into further negotiations 
to establish a comprehensive chapter on government procurement once Mongolia expresses its 
intention to join the GPA.68 More progressively, Japan’s Economic Partnership Agreement with 
Australia re-iterates the GPA’s prohibition on offsets in a dedicated provision69 evincing 
Australia’s willingness to embrace GPA controls on a bilateral basis.  Japan’s Economic 
Partnership Agreement with Peru, a developing country and also a non-GPA signatory, also 
prohibits offsets.70 The procurement chapter of Japan’s Economic Partnership Agreement with 
India prohibits discrimination in all procurement practices but does not address offsets explicitly. 
Given that the discriminatory nature of offsets may be thought of as derivative (offsets do not grant 
advantages to domestic suppliers over foreign ones even though they do promote domestic industry 
at the expense of foreign ones) it is difficult to envision whether an offset obligation would be 
unlawful under that agreement.71 
 Finally with respect to Asia’s somewhat uneven position on offsets, something should 
be said of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) which is a proposed 
RTA between the ten ASEAN Members (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, LAO 
PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam) and the six 
countries with which ASEAN has RTAs (Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea and New 
Zealand). This agreement is a major initiative in international economic integration and should 
carry much weight in guiding future policy.  Unfortunately it is unlikely that the RCEP will 
contain a government procurement chapter, let alone one which controls the use of offsets. This 
is despite the fact that two RCEP parties (Brunei Darussalam and New Zealand) are parties to 
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the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (P4 Agreement), which includes 
government procurement commitments including a prohibition on offsets.72  
 Generally speaking the reluctance of developing countries to surrender the use of 
offsets as a policy tool may reflect their long-standing view that domestic content should be 
preserved in the special field of government procurement as an appropriate way to remain 
competitive in markets dominated by firms from the developed world.  To a degree, this logic 
is supported by economic evidence. As noted above, studies have shown that certain types of 
offsets can be economically advantageous for less advanced countries.73 As such, it may be 
unwise for these countries seeking to gain a foothold in world markets to adopt blanket offset 
prohibitions in their RTAs or else they should be willing to accept such rules only where there 
are exceptions for development purposes (as in the GPA).  
As with the WTO TRIMs, the investment chapters of some RTAs as well as 
international investment agreements (IIAs) also prohibit performance requirements, which as 
noted above, resemble offsets.  NAFTA presents a list of seven specific types of host state 
measures that the state cannot impose or enforce on foreign firms.  These generally encompass 
domestic content type requirements, such as would be associated with an offset in the 
procurement context. These rules effectively recapture the prohibitions on trade-related 
investment measures found in the TRIMs, adding to them prohibitions relating to services.74  
Importantly for the purposes of offsets, the tribunal in the investor-state arbitration ADF Group 
v US ruled that NAFTA’s performance requirements prohibitions do not extend to the treaty’s 
government procurement rules, at least at the sub-national level.  The tribunal noted further 
that all three NAFTA members regularly imposed performance requirements as part of their 
national and sub-central government procurement regimes.75 This is despite the presence of the 
clear no-offset rule in NAFTA, applying to all levels of government.76 This award seems to 
suggest, although unfortunately does not explain, that there is a clear divide between 
performance requirements (which although prohibited under NAFTA do not apply to 
procurement), and offsets (which are prohibited under NAFTA but only apply to procurement).  
Japan has included exacting performance requirement prohibitions in some of its new 
IIAs, such as the Japan-Myanmar Bilateral Investment Treaty of 2013.77 Generally speaking, 
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modern RTAs between developing states (concluded within the last five years) tend not to 
include any reference to performance requirements in their investment chapters.  Broad 
performance requirement prohibitions in IIAs are often referred to as TRIMs plus obligations 
because they encompass more measures than the domestic content-related investment measures 
contained in the TRIMs, sometimes including services or mandating knowledge transfer. 
Similar enlarged prohibitions are found in numerous RTAs containing investment chapters.78 
Large emerging markets such as China and India have resisted prohibiting performance 
requirements in their IIAs.  Given their importance as tools of development, it is unlikely that 
the large emerging markets would be willing to accept treaties denying their governments to 
use of these instruments as tools of development,79 other than merely affirming the TRIMs. 
There is limited arbitral caselaw on performance requirement prohibitions in RTAs,80 none of 
which relates to procurement. 
 
 
  
V. CONCLUSION 
Offsets remain a common policy tool used by governments to ensure that the suppliers of 
procurement contracts contribute to the economy through domestic inputs, often raising the 
cost of contracts significantly without clear efficiency gains in terms of quality. Long 
associated with defence procurement, offsets are imposed by a number of governments, 
particularly in the developing world, in order to assist underperforming industries struggling 
with the rigours of globalization. The WTO has made progress in curtailing the use of offsets 
through a general prohibition in the GPA, but this agreement has selective coverage and 
currently has limited membership of countries that are almost exclusively developed and for 
whom offsets are no longer vital policy tools, outside the narrow sphere of defence.  Other than 
the GPA itself, the WTO agreements do not appear to be designed to restrain offsets in the 
context of procurement, although resistance to domestic preferences can be discerned in the 
TRIMs and the SCM as well as GATT itself.  These agreements disclose the WTO’s focus on 
non-discrimination in the context of normal market conditions, which do not appear to embrace 
public procurement by single purchasers engaging in contracts which favour suppliers using 
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local inputs.  Clearly exceptions in the GPA and RTAs for procurement preferences relating to 
national security, various public policy concerns along the lines of GATT XX as well as those 
in favour of developing countries were necessary to ensure that there would be sufficient 
support for open procurement rules taking into account domestic political pressures. As always, 
exceptions which are vaguely phrased or unevenly applied hold the potential for abuse for the 
purpose of according procurement advantages to domestic suppliers.  
For their part, RTAs show an uneven treatment of offsets, with many developing 
countries declining to include offset prohibitions even in those agreements which contain 
procurement chapters, a policy choice that appears to suggest a strategy for coping with the 
fragile industries exposed to the pressures of global competition. It should come as no surprise 
that resistance to offsets is more prevalent in RTAs concluded by developed states where firms 
have greater capacity to operate in fully competitive markets.  The reluctance of Asian states 
to embrace public procurement rules including offsets controls is particularly troubling given 
the growing economic influence of this region. Still, the TPP’s duplication of the Revised 
GPA’s procurement rules is an encouraging indication that open government purchasing, 
subject to reasonable limitations, is very much in the mind-set of some Asian powers. 
Furthermore, until such time as the GPA expands its membership or procurement chapters in 
developing country RTAs specifically address offset prohibitions, some of the harmful effects 
of these instruments can be mitigated by existing provisions on procurement transparency.  To 
the extent that firms are compelled to fulfil offsets in order to win tenders, a clearer 
understanding of the nature of offset obligations could lessen some of the burden of any 
unanticipated domestic preference conditions.  
 If it is true that some kinds of offsets can be beneficial to the states which use them 
without imposing significant distortions on international trade, then it may be worthwhile to 
restructure offset prohibitions in international agreements in favour of more nuanced control, 
possibly along the lines of the SCM’s so-called traffic light system.  Under this approach, offset 
requirements that serve developmental goals and do not cause demonstrable injury along with 
serious prejudice to foreign industries could be permissible.81 Offsets favouring domestic 
inputs should not necessarily be viewed as harmful in situations where foreign inputs were 
already inadequate or expensive. Clarification as to the type and extent of acceptable offsets 
could help deal with challenges to the TPP procurement chapter’s exception for balance of 
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payments problems, a provision which is disconcerting given that one of the purposes of offsets 
is often precisely to address these difficulties. Clear and reasonably tight rules on the use of 
this exception for offsets must be established. Secondly, given that offsets remain closely 
associated with defence-oriented procurement, it would be instructive to consider revising 
national security based exceptions in a manner that takes into account legitimate concerns while 
minimizing adverse trade impacts more effectively. Often all that is required to ensure national 
security in defence contracts is a degree of local oversight over the contract while still allowing 
most of the equipment to be sourced from abroad.82 Blanket exceptions for developing 
countries may require additional tailoring going forward as this designation may be unjustified 
for large scale projects undertaken in some fast growing emerging markets.83 
The uneven control of offsets under international law is problematic in as much as these 
instruments are understood to cause damaging distortions in trade as well as welfare losses to 
procuring governments overpaying for goods and services. This is worrisome because the use 
of offsets may be poised to intensify in step with enlarged public procurement as global 
spending on infrastructure by developing countries rises bolstered by the support of 
development banks. Still, sizable procurement budgets tend to be associated with more 
economically advanced countries.  Economic development is also closely linked to the 
presence of more mature markets consisting of domestic firms which are sufficiently robust to 
withstand competition and are therefore less needful of governmental assistance through offset 
protectionism. Accordingly, greater overall government procurement on a global scale may be 
counterbalanced by the diminished need for offsets, ultimately rendering their uneven 
regulatory control through the WTO and other international agreements in some senses 
redundant. 
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